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 NOTE 
Disregarding Statutory Safeguards: The 
Supreme Court of Missouri’s Failure to 
Recognize Manifest Injustice in Predatory 
Sexual Offender Determinations 
State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. 2017) (en banc) 
Lauren Vincent* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . 
. .”1  This right, in conjunction with the Due Process Clause,2 requires that each 
element of a crime be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.3  Over the 
course of the twentieth century, however, legislatures across the country have 
adopted schemes that allow certain factors that impact sentencing to be found 
by the trial judge, independent of the jury.4  The way these legislative sentenc-
ing schemes intersect with the jury-trial guarantee provided by the Sixth 
Amendment has been a subject of confusion and controversy for decades.5 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment 
in this context in a series of decisions, beginning with McMillan v. Pennsylva-
nia6 in 1986, followed by Apprendi v. New Jersey7 in 2000, Harris v. United 
 
*B.S. History Education, Missouri State University, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University 
of Missouri School of Law, 2019; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2018–2019.  
I am grateful to Dean Litton for his insight, guidance, and support during the writing of 
this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (extending the 
Sixth Amendment federal jury trial guarantee to the States). 
 2. Id. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due 
process of law . . . .”). 
 3. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509–10 (1995) (citing Sullivan v. Lou-
isiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277–78 (1993)). 
 4. Frank O. Bowman III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled Amer-
ican Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 368 
(2010). 
 5. Id. 
 6. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 7. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
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States8 in 2002, Blakely v. Washington9 in 2004, United States v. Booker10 in 
2005, and most recently Alleyne v. United States11 in 2013 and Hurst v. Flor-
ida12 in 2016.  In each of these opinions, the Court attempted to clarify the 
messy topic of constitutionality in criminal sentencing and grappled with 
providing answers to two questions.  First, what facts constitute elements of a 
crime such that a jury must prove them beyond a reasonable doubt?  Second, 
what facts that can impact sentencing are not elements but, rather, mere “sen-
tencing factors,” such that a judge may determine them by a lower standard of 
persuasion? 
However, with each decision, a “thicket of knotty issues” emerged, many 
of which involved determining the proper relationship between the judiciary 
and legislature in criminal sentencing.13  In June 2013, the United States Su-
preme Court sought to put these constitutional sentencing questions to rest with 
its decision in Alleyne.  Many legal scholars have written about the clarity they 
hoped Alleyne would bring to the national stage. 14  The general thrust of their 
scholarship voiced optimism that Alleyne would once and for all silence the 
ongoing sentencing debate regarding the proper relationship between the judi-
ciary and the legislature in sentence enhancement.15  The Supreme Court of 
Missouri’s August 2017 decision in State v. Johnson, however, proves that the 
clarity many legal scholars believed Alleyne would bring is more of a dream 
than a reality – at least in Missouri.16 
The predatory sexual offender sentence enhancement scheme, as written 
in the 2017 version of Missouri’s Criminal Code, provides a perfect illustration 
of the Sixth Amendment violations that can occur when the legislature allows 
a judge to make findings of fact that the Constitution requires to be proven to 
 
 8. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), overruled by Alleyne v. United 
States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). 
 9. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 10. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 11. Alleyne, 570 U.S. 99. 
 12. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 13. Bowman, supra note 4, at 368. 
 14. See generally James Barta, Note, Guarding the Rights of the Accused and Ac-
cuser: The Jury’s Role in Awarding Criminal Restitution Under the Sixth Amendment, 
51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463 (2014); The Supreme Court, 2012 Term – Leading Cases, 
Sixth Amendment – Right to a Jury Trial – Mandatory Minimum Sentences – Alleyne 
v. United States, 127 HARV. L. REV. 248 (2013) [hereinafter Leading Cases]; Ben Ash-
worth, Note, Between a Rock and a Hard 50: The Effect of the Alleyne Decision on 
Kansas’ Sentencing Procedures, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273 (2015); Nila Bala, 
Judicial Fact-Finding in the Wake of Alleyne, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 
(2015); Nancy J. King & Brynn E. Applebaum, Alleyne on the Ground: Factfinding 
that Limits Eligibility for Probation or Parole Release, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 287 
(2014). 
 15. See supra note 14. 
 16. See State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. 2017) (en banc). 
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a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.17  In August 2017, this sentencing scheme 
was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court of Missouri, for the first time 
since Alleyne was decided.18  In Johnson, the Supreme Court of Missouri de-
termined whether the fact that a defendant committed a sexual offense against 
multiple victims – a fact that, if found, triggers the enhanced sentencing mech-
anisms provided by the predatory sexual offender laws in Missouri’s Criminal 
Code – was an element of the crime, and thus “must be submitted to a jury and 
found beyond a reasonable doubt,” or a mere sentencing factor, and thus may 
be found independently by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence.19 
This Note scrutinizes the way in which the Supreme Court of Missouri 
resolved the issue of whether the predatory sexual offender statute, section 
566.125.5(3), is constitutional when applied to currently charged acts in light 
of the procedural mandates for sentence enhancement provided in section 
558.021.2.  This Note argues the Supreme Court of Missouri erred in its inter-
pretation of the statutory language provided in section 566.125.5(3) and in its 
application of Alleyne precedent.  This Note further argues the Supreme Court 
of Missouri failed to recognize the manifest injustice that resulted when the 
trial court disregarded the statutory timing requirements that should have been 
followed in order to extend Johnson’s sentence pursuant to the predatory sexual 
offender provisions. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Angelo Johnson was charged with thirteen felony counts related to the 
sexual abuse of his two step-daughters, D.P. and R.J., and his biological daugh-
ter, L.J.20  Johnson allegedly committed ongoing sexual abuse against the three 
girls, beginning when D.P. was five or six years old, R.J. was eleven years old, 
and L.J. was fifteen or sixteen years old.21  Specifically, the government 
charged Johnson with three counts of first-degree statutory rape,22 six counts 
 
 17. MO. REV. STAT. § 566.125 (Cum. Supp. 2017).  Between the time Johnson was 
charged and the publication of this Note, the Missouri General Assembly renumbered 
the statutes in the criminal code, specifically section 558.018, now codified at section 
566.125.  The Johnson court refers to the statute by its previous numbering.  However, 
for ease of use, the section numbers used in this Note reflect the current Missouri code, 
except as where indicated when expressly discussing the legislative history in Part 
III.C.  In places where quoted material from a case refers to a past version of a statute, 
the current section number appears in brackets. 
 18. See Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 508. 
 19. Id. at 509, 510–12. 
 20. Id. at 508.  Because the victims are minors, the court refers to them by their 
initials to protect their identities.  MO. REV. STAT. § 595.226.1 (Cum. Supp. 2017). 
 21. State v. Johnson, No. ED 101823, 2015 WL 7455477, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App.  
Nov. 24, 2015), transferred en banc to 524 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. 2017). 
 22. MO. REV. STAT. § 566.032 (Cum. Supp. 2017).  Johnson’s three counts of first-
degree statutory rape were Counts 1, 4, and 6.  Appellant’s Brief at 6, Johnson, 2015 
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of first-degree statutory sodomy,23 three counts of incest,24 and one count of 
second-degree statutory rape.25  Although he had no prior convictions, Johnson 
was additionally charged as a predatory sexual offender under Missouri Re-
vised Statutes section 566.125.5 because he allegedly committed an act against 
more than one victim.26  This charge subjected Johnson to the possibility of a 
life sentence with an eligibility of parole after twenty-five years.27  Without the 
 
WL 7455477 (No. ED 101823).  “A person commits the offense of [first-degree statu-
tory rape] if he or she has sexual intercourse with another person who is less than four-
teen years of age.” § 566.032.1.  “The offense of statutory rape in the first degree . . . 
is a felony for which the authorized term of imprisonment is life imprisonment or a 
term of years not less than five years” unless otherwise indicated by statute. Id. § 
566.032.2. 
 23. MO. REV. STAT. § 566.062 (Cum. Supp. 2017).  Johnson’s six counts of first-
degree statutory sodomy were Counts 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, and 11.  Appellant’s Brief, supra 
note 22, at *6.  Section 566.062.1 provides that a person commits the offense of first-
degree statutory sodomy if “he or she has deviate sexual intercourse with another per-
son who is less than fourteen years of age.” § 566.062.1 “The offense of statutory sod-
omy in the first degree . . . is a felony for which the authorized term of imprisonment 
is life imprisonment or a term of years not less than five years” unless otherwise indi-
cated by statute. Id. § 566.062.2. 
 24. MO. REV. STAT. § 568.020 (Cum. Supp. 2017).  Johnson’s three counts of in-
cest were Counts 5, 7, and 13. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 22, at *6.  Section 
568.020.1 provides that 
 
[a] person commits the offense of incest if he or she marries or purports to marry 
or engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a person he 
or she knows to be . . . his or her: (1) Ancestor or descendant by blood or adop-
tion; or (2) Stepchild, while the marriage creating that relationship exists; or (3) 
Brother or sister of the whole or half-blood; or (4) Uncle, aunt, nephew or niece 
of the whole blood.  
 
§ 568.020.1.  Incest is a class E felony violation. Id. § 568.020.2.  If a defendant has 
previously been found guilty of incest, the court shall not grant him probation.  Id. 
 25. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 508. 
 26. Johnson, 2015 WL 7455477, at *1; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 566.125.5(3) 
(Cum. Supp. 2017) (“Has committed an act or acts against more than one victim which 
would constitute an offense or offenses listed in subsection 4 of this section, whether 
or not the defendant was charged with an additional offense or offenses as a result of 
such act or acts.”). 
 27. Johnson, 2015 WL 7455477, at *1.  Johnson was not charged as a “predatory 
sexual offender as to L.J., given that the offenses against L.J. – incest and second-de-
gree statutory rape – are not predicate offenses for charging a defendant as a predatory 
sexual offender.”  Id. at *1 n.1.  Section 566.125.5 defines “predatory sexual offender” 
as a person who: 
 
(1) Has previously been found guilty of committing or attempting to commit 
any of the offenses listed in subsection 1 [of section 566.125] . . . ; or 
(2) Has previously committed an act which would constitute an offense 
listed in subsection 4 [of section 566.125], whether or not the act resulted in a 
conviction; or 
4
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predatory sexual offender charge, Johnson “would have been entitled to uncon-
ditional release after serving twenty-five years even if he received the maxi-
mum sentence.”28 
Johnson waived his statutory right to jury sentencing before trial.29  After 
the close of evidence and before submission of the case to the jury, the trial 
court considered the government’s request that it find Johnson to be a predatory 
sexual offender.30  The trial court made this consideration outside of the jury’s 
presence.31  The government’s argument that Johnson was a predatory sexual 
offender because he “[h]as committed an act or acts against more than one vic-
tim” rested on the allegations that formed the bases for the current charges 
against him.32  Johnson argued section 566.125.5(3) did not apply to him be-
cause the statute referred to prior acts only.33 
The trial court found that section 566.125.5(3) “d[id] not apply to the facts 
of [Johnson’s] situation,” reasoning that the statute is designed to contemplate 
a defendant’s prior conduct.34  As such, the trial court did not find Johnson to 
be a predatory sexual offender prior to submitting the case to the jury.35  Sub-
sequently, the jury found Johnson guilty on twelve of the thirteen counts.36  At 
sentencing, the government again requested that the trial court find Johnson to 
be a predatory sexual offender and subject him to a mandatory life sentence 
with a specified minimum term of twenty-five years.37  Johnson reiterated that 
section 566.125.5(3) did not apply to him.38  The trial court, however, found 
Johnson to be a predatory sexual offender upon the government’s request for 
 
 
(3) Has committed an act or acts against more than one victim which would 
constitute an offense or offenses listed in subsection 4 [of section 566.125], 
whether or not the defendant was charged with an additional offense or offenses 
as a result of such act or acts. 
 
§ 566.125.5 
 28. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 519 (Stith, J., dissenting); see generally MO. REV. 
STAT. § 558.011 (Cum. Supp. 2017). 
 29. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 508. 
 30. Id. at 509. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. State v. Johnson, No. ED 101823, 2015 WL 7455477, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App.  
Nov. 24, 2015), transferred en banc to 524 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. 2017). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 509.  The jury acquitted Johnson on Count 10: one 
count of first-degree statutory sodomy.  Id.; see also Appellant’s Brief, supra note 22, 
at *6. 
 37. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 509; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 566.125.6–566.125.7 
(Cum. Supp. 2017). 
 38. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 509. 
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reconsideration.39  The trial court stated its findings were “based on the evi-
dence that was presented at trial, the testimony that was presented by the three 
victims and, of course, by the verdicts that were returned by the jury in this 
number of counts.”40  Consequently, the trial court sentenced Johnson as a 
predatory sexual offender to eight concurrent terms of life imprisonment for 
his first-degree statutory sodomy and first-degree statutory rape convictions 
with eligibility for parole after twenty-five years.41 
On appeal, Johnson argued that, when applied to currently charged acts, 
section 566.125.5(3) is unconstitutional in light of the timing requirements set 
forth in section 558.021.2.42  Johnson argued that if a judge is permitted to 
deem a defendant a predatory sexual offender on the basis of currently charged 
acts, then the judge is required to find, before the case is submitted to the jury, 
that the defendant did, in fact, commit the acts alleged.43  According to John-
son, such an occurrence “force[s] the trial court to find facts which increase the 
mandatory minimum punishment in violation of Alleyne” and violates his right 
to a jury trial, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.44  Further, Johnson 
claimed the trial court violated section 558.021.2 in finding him to be a preda-
tory sexual offender because the trial judge made this finding after the case had 
already been submitted to the jury and after the jury returned its verdicts.45 
In a 5–2 ruling, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed Johnson’s con-
victions, holding: (1) section 566.125.5(3), which states that a defendant can 
be found to be a predatory sexual offender if he “[h]as committed an act or acts 
against more than one victim,” applies to currently charged acts and is consti-
tutional on its face; (2) no manifest injustice resulted from the trial court’s fail-
ure to adhere to the procedural requirements of section 558.021.2; and (3) the 
trial court appropriately sentenced Johnson as a predatory sexual offender.46 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Johnson, 2015 WL 7455477, at *2. 
 41. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 509.  Johnson still could have been sentenced to life 
imprisonment for each of the eight convictions without a predatory sexual offender 
finding, “but [he] would have been subject to a lesser mandatory minimum sentence of 
either [five] or [ten] years, depending on the conviction.”  Id. at 510. 
 42. Id. at 511, 513. 
 43. Id. at 512. 
 44. Id. (alteration in original).  Johnson also argued interpreting section 
558.018.5(3) to apply to charged acts violates his right to a jury trial guaranteed by 
article I, section 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution; however, Johnson made no separate 
due process argument.  Id. at 510 n.6. 
 45. Id. at 513. 
 46. Id. at 509–15 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 566.125.5 (Cum. Supp. 2017)). 
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss2/12
2018] DISREGARDING STATUTORY SAFEGUARDS 503 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court of Missouri relied primarily on its inter-
pretation of Alleyne in holding that section 566.125.5(3) of Missouri’s Crimi-
nal Code is facially constitutional when applied to currently charged acts.47  
First, this Part addresses the history and current structure of the nationwide 
criminal justice sentencing system.  Next, this Part discusses the United States 
Supreme Court’s trend toward reining in the expansive sentencing authority 
asserted by legislatures over the past several decades and analyzes how Alleyne 
and the Court’s subsequent decisions fit within that trend.  Lastly, this Part 
examines Missouri’s predatory sexual offender sentencing scheme, as de-
scribed in sections 566.125 and 558.021.2, and scrutinizes how the Supreme 
Court of Missouri has confronted the issue of determining whether manifest 
injustice results from violations of the timing requirements prescribed by sec-
tion 558.021.2. 
A.  The Criminal Justice System 
Legislatures for each state define crimes by statute.48  When a legislature 
defines a crime, it establishes a set of criteria, commonly known as “ele-
ments.”49  If the elements are proven by the government, a defendant will be 
subject to criminal liability and a corresponding range of punishments.50  It is 
a fundamental principle of law that before a defendant can be subjected to pun-
ishment, his criminal conviction must “rest upon a jury determination that [he] 
is guilty of every element of the crime” in question “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”51  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves a person “firmly 
convinced of the truth of a proposition.”52 
In response to various changes to American society, such as the civil 
rights movement, the anti-war movement,  and the development of a permeat-
ing drug subculture, a national trend “toward tougher, more definite, less dis-
cretionary criminal sentences” emerged in American criminal law toward the 
end of the twentieth century.53  The result of this tough-on-crime trend was the 
development of “structured sentencing” regimes that permitted sentencing 
commissions to “guide judicial sentencing discretion” by identifying certain 
 
 47. Id. at 510–13. 
 48. Bowman, supra note 4, at 370. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995). 
 52. Robert H. Dierker, Missouri Criminal Law, 32 MO. PRAC., Appendix – Penalty 
Phase Jury Instructions § 57:13 (3d ed. 2017).  “The law does not require proof that 
overcomes every possible doubt.”  Id.; see also MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (CRIMINAL) 
302.04. (3d ed.). 
 53. Bowman, supra note 4, at 374.  In conjunction with these social changes, the 
1960s and 1970s were characterized by rising violent crime and property crime rates.  
Id. 
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non-element criteria that could “influence the type and severity of punishment 
imposed on convicted defendants.”54  The government usually must only prove 
the existence of these non-element criteria by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.55  Unlike the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, sustaining a burden 
of proof by a “preponderance of the evidence” means that the government must 
show that the proposition in question is more likely to be correct than not.56 
Alongside this trend toward structured sentencing, legislatures began en-
forcing other sentence-enhancing mechanisms in the 1970s and 1980s, such as 
(1) separate mandatory minimum statutes, which enhanced the minimum pen-
alty for a crime beyond the penalty prescribed for the crime itself, and (2) leg-
islative “factual add-ons,” which attached penalty enhancements to proof of 
non-element criteria.57  Common factual add-ons include sentence enhance-
ments related to the commission of certain offenses on or within a specified 
distance of particular kinds of facilities, gun possession, and recidivism.58 
For several decades, there has been a “tug-of-war between the judiciary 
and the legislature over control of the sentencing process.”59  While the legis-
lature tries to increase sentences by forcing judges to increase minimums and 
maximums, judges fight back by holding that the facts needed to increase the 
minimums and maximums are elements of crimes that need to be proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt.60  Accompanying this tug-of-war has been wide-
spread criticism that judicially found facts, which may be proved by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, may impact a defendant’s actual sentence the same 
amount as the actual elements of the crime itself, which must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.61  This conflict is well illustrated by the predatory sexual 
offender statute and its accompanying procedural mandates, as discussed be-
low.62 
 
 54. Id. at 375–76. 
 55. Id. at 375–76, 379. 
 56. Kathleen A. Forsyth, Missouri Evidence, 22 MO. PRAC., Burdens of Proof, 
Production, and Persuasion – Generally § 300:6 (4th ed. 2017); see also Horning v. 
White, 314 S.W.3d 381, 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).  The preponderance of the evidence 
standard is more frequently employed in civil cases.  Id. 
 57. Bowman, supra note 4, at 376–77; see also Ewing v California, 538 U.S. 11, 
15 (2003) (discussing a “three strikes” recidivism statute that imposed minimum sen-
tences on defendants convicted of a specified number of prior offenses).  Many “factual 
add on” statutes increased maximum sentences, increased minimum sentences, or did 
both.  Bowman, supra note 4, at 377–78. 
 58. Id. at 377 & n.40; see e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (2012) (providing that any per-
son who “distribut[es], possess[es] with intent to distribute, or manufactur[es] a con-
trolled substance in or on, or within one thousand feet of” all public and private schools, 
colleges, public housing authority playgrounds, public swimming pools, or video ar-
cade facilities is subject to double the maximum penalty provided by federal law). 
 59. Leading Cases, supra note 14, at 257. 
 60. Id. at 248. 
 61. Bowman, supra note 4, at 378–79. 
 62. See infra Part III.C & D. 
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B.  The United States Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Jury-Trial 
Guarantee 
Until the twenty-first century, legislatures were given significant leeway 
when drafting criminal codes to determine whether a particular fact would be 
deemed an element to be decided beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or a 
sentencing factor to be decided by a preponderance of the evidence by a 
judge.63  Because of this authority, legislatures could freely remove certain is-
sues from the province of the jury and allow their resolution by a judge oper-
ating under a lesser burden of proof.64 
This broad legislative leeway was first discussed by the United States Su-
preme Court in McMillan.65  In McMillan, the defendant was convicted of ag-
gravated assault, which carried a maximum ten-year sentence.66  The govern-
ment asked the judge to apply the Pennsylvania Mandatory Minimum Sentenc-
ing Act (“PMMSA”) in crafting the defendant’s sentence. 67  The PMMSA re-
quired the imposition of a five-year mandatory-minimum term of imprison-
ment upon a sentencing judge’s finding that the defendant “visibly possessed 
a firearm.”68  Because proof of the visible possession raised the minimum sen-
tence on his aggravated assault conviction, the defendant contended that “visi-
ble possession” should be treated as an element of a more serious crime, which 
had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury.69  The Court rejected 
the defendant’s argument and held “that a fact triggering a mandatory-mini-
mum sentence was not an element but a mere ‘sentencing factor’” – at least 
with respect to the imposition of sentences no more severe than the statutory 
maximum prescribed for the offense itself.70  Because the finding that the de-
fendant was in visible possession of a firearm was not deemed an element of 
the offense, the Court maintained that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial was not violated.71 
 
 63. Leading Cases, supra note 14, at 254; see also Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Crim-
inal Acts and Sentencing Facts: Two Constitutional Limits on Criminal Sentencing, 23 
SETON HALL L. REV. 459, 477 (1993). 
 64. Leading Cases, supra note 14, at 254; see also Rosenberg, supra note 63, at 
477. 
 65. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Bowman, supra note 
4, at 382. 
 66. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82, 87.  McMillan’s case was consolidated with three 
other similarly situated criminal defendants on appeal.  Bowman, supra note 4, at 382 
n.72. 
 67. 42 PA. CONST. STAT. § 9712 (1982), invalidated by Commonwealth v. Valen-
tine, 101 A.3d 801 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (as cited in McMillan, 477 U.S. at 80). 
 68. Bowman, supra note 4, at 382 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81–82). 
 69. Id. at 382–83 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88). 
 70. Id. (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88–90). 
 71. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93. 
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This “high degree of authority over criminal sentencing,” as illustrated by 
McMillan, was curtailed by the United States Supreme Court’s momentous de-
cision, Apprendi.72  In Apprendi, the white defendant was charged with multi-
ple felony firearms charges after shooting at his African American neighbor’s 
house.73  He pled guilty to three of the charges, and the government dismissed 
the rest; however, pursuant to a plea agreement, the government reserved the 
right to seek an enhanced sentence based on the New Jersey hate crime stat-
ute.74  To apply the hate crime sentence enhancement, the judge was required 
to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s actions were 
taken with a “purpose to intimidate.”75  The defendant challenged the sentence 
enhancement and argued that the finding of a “purpose to intimidate” is an 
“element” of the crime that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt 
because it is a fact that increased his sentence beyond the statutory maximum 
prescribed for the offense itself.76 
In Apprendi, the Court held in a split 5–4 decision that “any fact that in-
creases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum” is 
an element of a crime that “must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” regardless of the legislature’s designation.77  The Court re-
jected the idea that a fact triggering sentence enhancement could be a mere 
sentencing factor and instead placed emphasis on the purpose and effect of the 
provision at issue.78  Curiously, the majority in Apprendi declined to overrule 
McMillan’s holding and instead chose to limit McMillan’s holding to cases that 
“do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory 
maximum for the offense.”79 
In a separate concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that a “crime” 
should include “every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing 
punishment.”80  In Justice Thomas’s view, a jury should be required to find any 
 
 72. Leading Cases, supra note 14, at 253 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466 (2000)). 
 73. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469. 
 74. Id. at 468–70; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39–4(a) (West 1995) (as cited in 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468) (classifying the possession of a firearm for an unlawful 
purpose as a “second-degree” offense); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44–3(e) (West Supp. 
1999–2000) (as cited in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469) (providing for an “extended term” 
of imprisonment if the trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “[t]he 
defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or 
group of individuals because of race, color”). 
 75. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 490. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 487 n.13. 
 80. Id. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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fact affecting the “kind, degree, or range of punishment” to which the prosecu-
tion is entitled.81  In many ways, Justice Thomas’s concurring view paved the 
way for the Alleyne result, as further discussed below.82 
While the Apprendi decision seemed expansive, the Court’s choice to up-
hold McMillan while simultaneously holding that it was “unconstitutional for 
a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the 
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed”83 
spurred confusion with respect to facts that increase the statutory minimum.84  
In the years following the Apprendi decision, the Court released a number of 
Sixth Amendment sentencing decisions that prolonged confusion with respect 
to constitutional sentencing.85 
The lack of clarity with regard to facts increasing statutory minimums 
was showcased in Harris.86  In Harris, the Court held that a fact increasing the 
defendant’s minimum sentence by two years was a sentencing factor that may 
be determined upon a preponderance of the evidence by the judge, as opposed 
to an element of the offense to be found by the jury.87  In so holding, the Court 
backtracked and reaffirmed its conclusion in McMillan, where the Court orig-
inally concluded that a fact that increases a mandatory minimum sentence may 
be treated as a mere sentencing factor.88 
The Court’s decisions in Blakely89 and Booker90 further transformed crim-
inal sentencing.  Both Blakely and Booker reaffirmed the holding of Apprendi 
and expanded its reach.91  In Blakely, the defendant was convicted of second-
degree kidnapping, a “class B felony” that carried a maximum sentence of ten 
years.92  Washington’s Sentencing Guidelines statute, however, created a 
“standard [sentencing] range” for the offense and permitted the judge to deviate 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. See infra notes 96–101. 
 83. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 252, 252 
(1999) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 84. Leading Cases, supra note 14, at 257. 
 85. Id. at 248. 
 86. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), overruled by Alleyne v. United 
States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). 
 87. Id. at 568. 
 88. Leading Cases, supra note 14, at 248. 
 89. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 90. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 91. Leading Cases, supra note 14, at 256; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303–04; Booker, 
543 U.S. at 233. 
 92. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.40.030 (West 
2003) (defining the crime of second-degree kidnapping and classifying it as a Class B 
felony); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.021(1)(b) (West 1998) (specifying 
the maximum punishment for a Class B felony as imprisonment for a term of ten years, 
a fine of $20,000, or both). 
11
Vincent: Disregarding Statutory Safeguards: The Supreme Court of Missouri'
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
508 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
from that “standard range” if additional factual findings were made at sentenc-
ing.93  The Court held that, in light of Apprendi, allowing upward departures 
from the standard range based on judicial fact-finding alone violated a defend-
ant’s Sixth Amendment guarantee “that a prosecutor prove to a jury all facts 
legally essential to the punishment.”94  One year after the Blakely decision, the 
Court extended its reasoning to cover the Federal Guidelines as well.95 
With Alleyne,96 the Court began what has been referred to as “the next 
major chapter in the rollback of structured sentencing regimes and legislative 
designation of sentencing factors”97 first initiated by Apprendi.  In Alleyne, the 
Court overruled Harris, holding that its “distinction between facts that increase 
the statutory maximum and facts that increase only the mandatory minimum . 
. . is inconsistent with our decision in Apprendi . . . and with the original mean-
ing of the Sixth Amendment.98  The Court noted that Apprendi’s holding re-
quires that any fact that necessarily raises the defendant’s “penalty” is an ele-
ment for the jury.99 
Adopting the reasoning of Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Ap-
prendi, the Court in Alleyne determined that facts that increase the mandatory 
minimum sentence “alter the prescribed range of sentences to which a defend-
ant is exposed to” and aggravate his punishment accordingly; therefore, any 
fact that leads to such an increase is an element that the jury must find beyond 
a reasonable doubt.100  Alleyne brought consistency and clarification to many 
years of confusing sentencing practices involving distinctions between facts 
that increase a defendant’s mandatory minimum or maximum and continued 
“the judiciary’s recent trend of reining in the expansive sentencing authority 
asserted by legislatures” in the years following Apprendi.101 
In 2016, the United States Supreme Court determined in Hurst102 that a 
state statute requiring the trial court to find an aggravating circumstance, inde-
pendent and in addition to the jury’s own fact-finding, was unconstitutional 
 
 93. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299; see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(2) (West 
2000), invalidated by Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (providing that “a judge may impose a 
sentence above the standard range if he finds ‘substantial and compelling reasons jus-
tifying an exceptional sentence’”). 
 94. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313–14. 
 95. See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see also Leading 
Cases, supra note 14, at 256. 
 96. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). 
 97. Leading Cases, supra note 14, at 248. 
 98. Alleyne, 570 U.S at 103. 
 99. Id.; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 100. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 107–08. 
 101. Leading Cases, supra note 14, at 248. 
 102. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
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under Alleyne.103  In Hurst, a jury convicted the defendant of first-degree mur-
der – which is a capital felony in Florida.104  Under Florida law, life imprison-
ment is the maximum sentence a capital felon may receive upon conviction.105  
Florida employed a “hybrid” approach to sentencing, which allowed a “jury 
[to] render[] an advisory verdict” but required “the judge [to] make[] the ulti-
mate sentencing determination[].”106  Therefore, Florida law provided that 
“[n]otwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, 
after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sen-
tence of life imprisonment or death.”107  Although the judge must give the jury 
recommendation “great weight,” the sentencing order must “reflect the trial 
judge’s independent judgment about the existence of aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors.”108 
The jury in Hurst recommended an advisory verdict that the defendant be 
subjected to a death sentence.109  The judge in Hurst independently agreed, 
finding the presence of aggravating factors.110  The defendant appealed, argu-
ing his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment in light of Ring v. Arizona,111 
a United States Supreme Court case holding that capital defendants have the 
right to have any fact that could trigger an increase in punishment submitted to 
a jury.112  The Court held that even though the jury also made the requisite 
findings that allowed the trial judge to sentence the defendant to death, the 
Florida statute at issue in Hurst ran afoul of Alleyne because it required the trial 
judge to make a factual finding necessary for enhanced sentencing to take ef-
fect.113  According to the Court, such a statute did not “provide[] the defendant 
additional protection” and violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
trial by jury.114 
Despite the long line of Sixth Amendment United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that clarified the rule that the finding of any fact that leads to an 
increase in a defendant’s sentencing penalty must be considered an element for 
the jury – and the jury alone – to find beyond a reasonable doubt, in Johnson 
 
 103. Id. at 624. 
 104. Id. at 619–20; see also FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a) (2010). 
 105. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 620.; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (2010). 
 106. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 620 (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 n.6 
(2002)). 
 107. Id. at 620; see also FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2010), invalidated by Perry v. 
State, 210 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 2016). 
 108. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 620 (first quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 
1975) (per curiam), then quoting Blackwelder v. State, 851 So. 2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2003) 
(per curiam)). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.; see also Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. 
 112. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. 
 113. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622. 
 114. Id. 
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the Supreme Court of Missouri was confronted with a statutory challenge sim-
ilar to those raised by the defendants in Alleyne and Hurst and came to the 
opposite conclusion.115 
C.  Missouri Criminal Code Sections 558.018.5 and 558.021.2 
In 1995, the Missouri General Assembly comprehensively revised the 
sexual offenses chapter of Missouri’s Criminal Code.116  The 1995 revision 
expanded the number of sexual offenses, especially with respect to offenses 
against children, and provided for harsher punishments on convicted defend-
ants than the previous 1979 code.117  In 1996, the Missouri House of Repre-
sentatives introduced House Bill No. 974, which proposed the addition of a 
“predatory sexual offender” category to Missouri’s Criminal Code.118  Law-
makers chose the word “predatory” to describe the defendants subject to the 
newly proposed law to “instill[] a certain image of a sex offender lurking in 
every dark area.”119  The “predatory” descriptor facilitated the public’s percep-
tion in the mid-1990s that sex offenders employed “animalistic type[s] of be-
havior” and would “resume their hunt for victims” upon their release from in-
carceration.120 
The Missouri legislature ultimately amended Missouri’s Criminal Code 
to include a predatory sexual offender category defined in section 558.018.121  
Section 558.018.5(3) provided that –– in addition to persons who have previ-
ously been found or pleaded guilty to specific sexual felonies or have previ-
ously committed a specified sexual felony, whether or not a conviction resulted 
– a predatory sexual offender included a person who “[h]as committed an act 
or acts against more than one victim . . . whether or not the defendant was 
charged with an additional offense or offenses as a result of such act or acts.”122 
With the enactment of the 1996 legislation, defendants who were deemed 
predatory sexual offenders were subject to mandatory life sentences in all 
cases, and to certain specified minimum terms of not less than thirty years with 
the possibility of probation or fifteen years without probation or parole when 
 
 115. See State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. 2017) (en banc). 
 116. Robert H. Dierker, Evolution of Missouri Law, 32 MO. PRAC., Mo. Crim. Law 
§ 23:2 (3d ed. 2017). 
 117. Id. 
 118. H.B. 974, 88th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1996); see also Robert Mac-
Kenzie, New Developments or More of the Same? A Historical, Sociological, and Po-
litical Look at Missouri’s Sex Offender Laws from 1995 to 2013 at 19 (Apr. 16, 2014) 
(M.A. thesis, University of Missouri, St. Louis) (available at http://irl.umsl.edu/the-
sis/69). 
 119. MacKenzie, supra note 118, at 21. 
 120. Id.  
 121. MO. REV. STAT. § 558.018 (1996) (current version at MO. REV. STAT. § 
566.125 (Cum. Supp. 2017)). 
 122. § 558.018.5(3). 
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they had prior convictions for specified sexual offenses.123  Under section 
558.018.4, a defendant could only be deemed a predatory sexual offender if the 
trial judge found him to be a predatory sexual offender and the defendant was 
also found guilty of committing or attempting to commit one of the several 
predicate crimes listed by a jury.124 
Section 558.018 underwent several subsequent revisions, most signifi-
cantly in 2006125 and 2013.126  The predatory sexual offender category, as de-
fined in subsection 5 of the statute, however, has retained its original 1996 lan-
guage.127  Therefore, under the current predatory sexual offender scheme, both 
the jury and the trial judge must find a defendant to be a predatory sexual of-
fender before imposing an extended sentencing term.128  Section 558.021.2, 
which defines the procedures that must be followed by the trial court in sub-
jecting a defendant to enhanced sentencing as a predatory sexual offender, fur-
ther provides that in a jury trial, the trial court must make its finding that a 
defendant is a predatory sexual offender “prior to [the case’s] submission to 
the jury outside of its hearing.”129 
D.  “Manifest Injustice” Determinations in Missouri 
Missouri appellate courts are frequently tasked with determining whether 
an alleged trial court error has resulted in “manifest injustice.”  It is well estab-
lished that, to be preserved for review, all objections made at trial “must be 
specific and made contemporaneously with the purported error.”130  When a 
defendant fails to timely object to a finding made by the trial court, but none-
theless argues on appeal that the finding he contests was error, his claim is 
entitled only to plain error review at the discretion of the appellate court.131  
Under this heightened standard of review, an appellate court must determine 
 
 123. Id. §§ 558.018.6–558.018.7. 
 124. Id. § 558.018.4.  Relevant here, the predicate crimes listed in section 558.018.1 
include first-degree statutory sodomy and first-degree statutory rape.  Id. § 558.018.1. 
 125. See H.B. 1290, 93d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006). 
 126. See H.B. 215, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013). 
 127. The definition of “predatory sexual offender” and the mandatory minimum 
and maximum sentences associated with such a finding can be found in section 566.125 
of the 2017 Missouri Code, rather than section 558.018.  MO. REV. STAT. § 566.125 
(Cum. Supp. 2017).  The 2017 Code maintains that a court sentencing a predatory sex-
ual offender can fix the minimum term of imprisonment before parole anywhere within 
the range of punishment, up to and including the entirety of a person’s natural life.  See 
generally id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. MO. REV. STAT. § 558.021.2 (2016).  Section 558.021.2 provides an exception 
to the procedural mandates of this section for facts required by subsection 4 of section 
558.016, which relates to persistent misdemeanor offenders.  Id. 
 130. State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 426 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 131. Id. 
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whether the claimed error is a “plain error affecting substantial rights.”132 “An 
error is plain if it is ‘evident, obvious, and clear,’”133 and “‘substantial rights’ 
are involved if . . . there are significant grounds for believing that the error is 
of the type from which manifest injustice . . . could result if left uncorrected.”134 
Missouri courts have long held that determining what constitutes “mani-
fest injustice” is based primarily on the facts and circumstances of each indi-
vidual case.135  Unfortunately, Missouri courts have not provided much insight 
into the meaning behind the phrase “manifest injustice.”136  Indeed, most court 
opinions offer a vague and circular explanation of the concept.137  In Missouri, 
application of the “manifest injustice” standard has been criticized for its con-
clusory, and highly subjective, nature.138  However, Missouri appellate courts 
seem to be in agreeance that “[b]eing sentenced to a punishment greater than 
the maximum sentence for an offense constitutes plain error resulting in mani-
fest injustice.”139 
The Supreme Court of Missouri has decided multiple cases that provide 
insight into what constitutes a procedural timing violation of section 558.021.2, 
which requires a trial court to make the predicate findings prior to submission 
of the case to the jury.140  In each of these cases, the court has provided clues 
about how and why “manifest injustice” determinations are made. 
In State v. Emery, the court held that permitting the government to present 
new evidence of the defendant’s prior offenses in support of his alleged prior 
and persistent offender status while the case was on remand for re-sentencing 
would violate the timing requirement of section 558.021.2.141  The court rea-
soned that because section 558.021.2 requires presentation of such evidence 
prior to the case’s submission to the jury, any presentation of the defendant’s 
 
 132. State v. Hunt, 451 S.W.3d 251, 260 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 133. Id. (quoting State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 607 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. State v. Baxter, 204 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Mo. 2006) (en banc); see also State v. 
Winfield, 5 S.W.3d 505, 516 (Mo. 1999) (en banc). 
 136. Kenneth D. Dean, Equitable Estoppel Against the Government – The Missouri 
Experience: Time to Rethink the Concept, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 63, 106 (1992). 
 137. Id. at 104. 
 138. “Injustice may, like beauty, be found only in the eye of the beholder.”  Id. at 
106. 
 139. State v. Davis, 533 S.W.3d 853, 864–65 (Mo. Ct. App.  2017) (quoting State 
v. Taborn, 412 S.W.3d 466, 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013)); accord State v. Hardin, 429 
S.W.3d 417, 419 (Mo. 2014) (en banc); State v. Lemons, 351 S.W.3d 27, 32 (Mo. Ct. 
App.  2011); State v. Severe, 307 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Mo. 2010) (en banc); State v. Ki-
mes, 234 S.W.3d 584, 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 140. See State v. Emery, 95 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); Severe, 307 
S.W.3d at 644–45; State v. Teer, 275 S.W.3d 258, 260–62 (Mo. 2009) (en banc); see 
also MO. REV. STAT. § 558.021.2 (2016). 
 141. Emery, 95 S.W.3d at 101–02. 
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prior convictions on remand would run afoul of the aforementioned procedural 
timing mandates.142 
In State v. Teer, the court held that manifest injustice resulted when the 
trial court found the defendant to be a status offender after the jury had already 
recommended a sentence.143  Because the defendant’s status as a prior offender 
was not pleaded and proven prior to the case’s submission to the jury, the court 
held that the plain language of section 558.021.2 was violated.144  Because the 
defendant in Teer was subjected to a sentence of twenty years rather than a 
sentence of four years, as recommended by a jury of his peers, the court found 
that the trial court’s untimely findings deprived the defendant of the benefit of 
a more lenient jury-recommended sentence and thus resulted in manifest injus-
tice.145 
One year later, in State v. Severe, the court held that a defendant suffered 
manifest injustice after he was sentenced as a status offender because the gov-
ernment failed to plead and prove his prior convictions, as required to be 
deemed a status offender, prior to submission of his case to the jury.146  The 
court decided that allowing the government to present new evidence of his prior 
convictions would give the government “two bites at the apple” and that, pur-
suant to the timing requirements of section 558.021.2, no additional evidence 
could be presented against the defendant at re-sentencing.147  Most recently, in 
State v. Collins,148 the court found that a defendant suffered manifest injustice 
after he was sentenced as a chronic DWI offender despite the government’s 
failure to adduce, prior to sentencing, the evidence necessary to subject him to 
such a determination.149 
Two common themes can be deduced from Supreme Court of Missouri 
cases interpreting whether and how “manifest injustice” has resulted after trial 
court violations of section 558.021.2 timing requirements.  First, Emery, Se-
vere, and Collins established that manifest injustice will result if a defendant is 
sentenced as a status offender, yet the government has failed to establish its 
burden of proof prior to submission of the case to the jury.  Second, Teer es-
tablished that manifest injustice will result if the trial court fails to make its 
predicate findings before the jury has made its requisite verdicts and recom-
mended a sentence.  In Johnson, discussed further below, the court clarified 
and reaffirmed the theme endorsed by its decisions in Emery, Severe, and Col-
lins by noting that the government did not fail to meet its burden of proof in 
finding Johnson to be a predatory sexual offender.  The court, however, seemed 
to carve out the following exception to the theme it announced in Teer in its 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Teer, 275 S.W.3d at 260. 
 144. Id. at 261–62. 
 145. Id. at 262. 
 146. State v. Severe, 307 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
 147. Id. 
 148. State v. Collins, 328 S.W.3d 705 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 149. Id. at 710. 
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more recent Johnson opinion: a trial court’s failure to make its predicate find-
ings before submission of a case to the jury only results in manifest injustice if 
the defendant has not waived his statutory right to jury sentencing before trial. 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
This Part examines the several facets of the Supreme Court of Missouri’s 
Johnson decision in three sections.  First, this Part dissects the majority opin-
ion’s holding and reasoning, as authored by Judge Zel M. Fischer.  Second, this 
Part distinguishes the reasoning presented by Judge Patricia Breckenridge in 
her concurrence.  Third, this Part analyzes the reasoning behind Judge Laura 
Denvir Stith’s dissent. 
A. The Majority Opinion 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that: (1) section 
566.125(3)150 applies to charged acts and is constitutional on its face; (2) no 
manifest injustice resulted from the trial court’s failure to adhere to the proce-
dural requirements of section 558.021; and (3) the trial court appropriately sen-
tenced Johnson as a predatory sexual offender.151 
In so holding, the court first determined that section 566.125.5(3) unam-
biguously applies to prior acts as well as acts that form the bases for current 
charges.152  The court noted that section 566.125.5(3) refers only to “an act or 
acts against more than one victim,” without reference to “prior” or “previous 
acts.”153  The court explained that to hold, as Johnson argued, that section 
558.018.5(3) applies only to prior acts, the Supreme Court of Missouri would 
have to impermissibly add language to an unambiguous statute and find section 
558.018.5(3) to be superfluous in light of section 558.018.5(2), which allows a 
predatory sexual offender determination to be made if a person “[h]as previ-
ously committed an act which would constitute an offense listed in subsection 
4 of this section, whether or not the act resulted in a conviction.”154 
Next, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that section 
566.125.5(3) is constitutional on its face and does not “run afoul” of the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne.155  In Alleyne, the United States 
Supreme Court held that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the [mandatory min-
imum sentence] is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found 
 
 150. Section 566.125.5(3) states that a defendant can be found to be a predatory 
sexual offender if he “[h]as committed an act or acts against more than one victim.” 
MO. REV. STAT. § 566.125.5(3) (Cum. Supp. 2017). 
 151. See State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d 505 (2017) (en banc). 
 152. Id. at 510–11. 
 153. Id.; see also § 566.125.5(3). 
 154. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 509. 
 155. Id. at 511–13; see also Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). 
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beyond a reasonable doubt.”156  Applying this holding to Johnson’s case, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri found that the “fact that increase[d] the mandatory 
minimum sentence [was] that [Johnson] committed acts against more than one 
victim.”157  According to the court, Alleyne required only that, pursuant to sec-
tion 566.125.5(3), the fact Johnson committed acts against multiple victims be 
submitted to and found by the jury.158  The court contended that Alleyne’s hold-
ing did not prohibit a statute from requiring that a trial court additionally find 
this fact.159  Indeed, the Supreme Court of Missouri asserted that “[r]equiring 
a trial court to also find the necessary facts [was] a layer of protection above 
and beyond that required by Alleyne.”160 
The court held the trial court’s violation of the timing requirement in sec-
tion 558.021.2 was “immaterial to the constitutional analysis” of section 
566.125.5(3).161  The court reasoned that even if the procedural mandates of 
section 558.021.2 would have been properly followed in Johnson’s case, “the 
[trial court’s] pre-submission determination, by itself, would not have violated 
Johnson’s constitutional right” because such pre-submission findings of fact 
would not have removed Johnson’s right to have the jury subsequently find the 
same facts thereafter.162 
Lastly, the court determined that although the trial court’s failure to com-
ply with the procedural mandates of section 558.021.2 was “evident, obvious, 
and clear” in Johnson’s case, such error did not result in manifest injustice.163  
The court distinguished Johnson’s case from a number of others in which it 
previously held manifest injustice resulted where the defendant was sentenced 
as a status offender after the trial court violated similar statutory require-
ments.164  In previous cases, the court found manifest injustice only when the 
necessary preconditions to sentencing a defendant as a status offender were 
altogether absent; that is, “the respective defendants were sentenced based on 
 
 156. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 511–12 (quoting Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103). 
 157. Id. at 512. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 512 & n.8. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 512. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 513.  Johnson failed to object to any violation of section 558.021.2 at his 
sentencing hearing; therefore, his claim of error with regard to section 558.021.2 was 
not preserved on appeal.  Despite the lack of preservation at the trial court level, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed his claim under plain error review.  “[P]lain errors 
affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion of the court when the 
error has resulted in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice.”  Id. (alteration in orig-
inal) (quoting State v. Hunt, 451 S.W.3d 251, 260 (Mo. 2014) (en banc)). 
 164. Id. at 514–15; see also State v. Collins, 328 S.W.3d 705, 708–10 (Mo. 2011) 
(en banc) (per curiam); State v. Severe, 307 S.W.3d 640, 642–45 (Mo. 2010) (en banc); 
State v. Emery, 95 S.W.3d 98, 101–02 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); State v. Wilson, 343 
S.W.3d 747, 750–51 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Starnes, 318 S.W.3d 208, 210–18 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
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an offender status never proved by the State or never expressly found by the 
[trial] court . . . or the State was unfairly given ‘two bites at the apple’ when 
the statute allows only one bite.”165  Because Johnson did not complain of the 
aforementioned preconditions, the court concluded that no manifest injustice 
resulted from the trial court’s violation of section 558.021.2.166 
Ultimately, the court in Johnson maintained that even if Johnson had not 
been deemed a predatory sexual offender, his statutory rape and statutory sod-
omy convictions still carried possible sentences of life in prison, and the fact 
that Johnson had waived his statutory right to be sentenced by a jury of his 
peers remained unchanged.167  As such, the court held that the trial court sub-
jected Johnson to the same sentence he would have received had the trial judge 
not initially made a mistaken reading of the statute.168  Thus, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri held that the trial court properly sentenced Johnson as a predatory 
sexual offender pursuant to section 566.125.5(3), and no manifest injustice re-
sulted.169 
B. The Concurring Opinion 
In her concurrence, Judge Breckenridge agreed with the majority’s con-
clusion that section 558.018.5(3), as written, applies to currently charged acts 
and is facially constitutional.170  She disagreed, however, with the majority 
opinion’s analyses of these issues.171 
First, Judge Breckenridge wrote that because the statutory language of 
section 566.125.5(3) encompasses acts that form the bases for the current 
charges, and section 558.021.2 procedurally requires a trial court to make fac-
tual findings regarding offenses addressed by section 558.018.5(3), any finding 
by the trial court that a defendant is a predatory sexual offender violates the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in light of Alleyne.172 
Second, according to Judge Breckenridge, section 566.125.5(3)’s statu-
tory scheme may only be constitutionally applied when prior convictions in-
volving multiple victims are used to establish the defendant’s status as a pred-
atory sexual offender.173  She reasoned that because “[p]rior convictions are 
 
 165. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 514 (quoting Severe, 307 S.W.3d at 645). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 515. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. (Breckenridge, J., concurring). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 516. 
 173. Id. 
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not facts that must be submitted to the jury for purposes of sentencing enhance-
ment,”174 the Alleyne rule is not violated when prior convictions involving mul-
tiple victims are used to establish the defendant’s status as a predatory sexual 
offender.175 
Third, Judge Breckenridge contended that the submission to and finding 
by the jury of the necessary fact that increases the mandatory minimum sen-
tence – in Johnson’s case, that he committed an act or acts against more than 
one victim – may only be relevant to whether the defendant was prejudiced by 
the constitutional violation.176  Judge Breckenridge noted another difficulty 
with the predatory sexual offender sentencing scheme provided by sections 
566.125(3) and 558.021.2: a trial judge can find a defendant to be a predatory 
sexual offender if he finds the defendant committed offenses against multiple 
victims, regardless of whether the government charged the defendant with 
those additional acts.177  Put another way, under the statute, a trial judge is 
authorized to find a defendant to be a predatory sexual offender on the basis of 
offenses that the jury does not subsequently find the defendant guilty of com-
mitting. 
Judge Breckenridge concluded that section 566.125.5(3) should be found 
unconstitutional as applied when used to classify a defendant, like Johnson, as 
a predatory sexual offender based on acts committed against multiple victims 
without the presence of prior convictions.178  Nevertheless, she concluded that 
under the facts and circumstances of Johnson’s case, the Alleyne violation did 
not require reversal of his convictions because “the facts that increased Mr. 
Johnson’s mandatory minimum sentence . . . were submitted to and found by 
the jury” beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore no prejudice resulted.179 
C. The Dissenting Opinion 
In her dissent, Judge Stith, joined by Judge George W. Draper III, wrote 
that the trial judge’s failure to follow section 558.021.2 was determinative of 
whether Johnson was deemed a predatory sexual offender and resulted in man-
ifest injustice.180  According to Judge Stith, a strict adherence to the procedural 
requirements set forth by section 558.021.2 would have precluded the trial 
judge from finding section 566.125(3) applicable to Johnson and thus would 
have prevented the trial judge’s ability to enhance Johnson’s sentence.181  
Judge Stith argued that the majority opinion “unequivocally . . . permit[s] what 
 
 174. Id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 
 175. Id. (citing Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)). 
 176. Id. at 517. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 518. 
 180. Id. (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 181. Id. 
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Alleyne prohibits – using a trial judge’s findings to increase the mandatory min-
imum.”182 
Judge Stith provided three deficiencies in the majority’s argument that no 
manifest injustice resulted from the trial judge’s failure to comply with the pro-
cedural requirements of section 558.021.2.183  First, she asserted that the trial 
judge committed plain error when he failed to require the state to present any 
evidence outside the jury’s hearing to separately establish that Johnson was a 
predatory sexual offender, as required by section 558.021.2.184  Second, she 
noted that the trial judge made his evidentiary findings after rather than before 
submission to the jury, violating the procedural requirements of section 
558.021.2.185  Finally, she argued the trial judge impermissibly based his find-
ing that Johnson was a predatory sexual offender on the evidence presented to 
the jury, violating the requirement of section 558.021.2 that a trial judge’s pred-
atory sexual offender determination be based on evidence presented outside the 
jury’s presence.186 
Further, Judge Stith wrote that section 566.125.5(3) should not have been 
found to permit current charges to provide the basis of Johnson’s predatory 
sexual offender designation.187  Judge Stith disagreed with the majority’s rea-
soning that because section 566.125.5(3) does not use the term “previously” in 
providing what charges can form the basis of a predatory sexual offender find-
ing, the court can permissibly base a predatory sexual offender determination 
on the very charges being submitted to the jury.188 
Instead, Judge Stith noted that section 566.125.5(3) provides a predatory 
sexual offender determination is to be based on “whether or not the defendant 
was charged with an additional offense or offenses as a result of such act or 
acts.”189  According to Judge Stith, the purpose of section 566.125.5(3) is to 
allow the trial judge to consider conduct in addition to that charged in the cur-
rent case, regardless of whether that additional conduct itself resulted in other 
charges.190  Because “the actual offenses charged cannot be ‘additional’ to 
 
 182. Id. at 522. 
 183. Id. at 518–19. 
 184. Id. at 519. 
 185. Id.  Judge Stith noted that section 558.021.2 sets out a single exception in 
which the trial judge is permitted to make a determination of whether a defendant is a 
“dangerous offender” under subdivision 558.016.4(1) after submission to the jury based 
on evidence presented at trial.  Id. at 520.  She asserted that that exception clearly did 
not apply in Johnson’s case, and therefore the trial court erred in allowing the trial judge 
to make a finding that Johnson was a predatory sexual offender after submission of his 
case to the jury.  Id. 
 186. Id. at 519. 
 187. Id. at 523–24. 
 188. Id. at 523. 
 189. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT.§ 566.125.5(3) (Cum. Supp. 2017)). 
 190. Id. 
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themselves,” Judge Stith maintained the charged offenses cannot form the basis 
of a predatory sexual offender determination.191 
Judge Stith concluded that to hold, as the majority held, that current 
charges may provide the basis for a predatory sexual offender determination 
would mean that “the enhanced mandatory minimum applies in every case with 
more than one victim, as it requires the trial judge to determine prior to sub-
mission whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant 
committed a listed act against more than one victim.”192  She concluded that 
such a scheme could not have been what the legislature intended and held that 
she would vacate the trial judge’s determination that Johnson was a predatory 
sexual offender and remand for resentencing.193 
V. COMMENT 
With its decision in Johnson, the Supreme Court of Missouri sent a clear 
message to predatory sexual offenders – that it is possible to be labeled as a 
“predator” and subjected to enhanced sentencing despite: (1) the absence of a 
prior sexual felony conviction; (2) the absence of the admission of prior sexual 
felonious acts into evidence, regardless of whether those acts resulted in con-
viction; and (3) the trial court’s failure to comply with legislatively mandated 
procedural sentencing requirements.194 
First, this Part addresses the drawbacks and inconsistencies in the Su-
preme Court of Missouri’s statutory interpretation of section 566.125.5(3).  
Specifically, this Part asserts that Section 566.125.5(3) cannot be reconciled 
with the holding in Alleyne when it is interpreted as applying the predatory 
sexual offender determination to presently charged acts.  Second, this Part 
notes the Supreme Court of Missouri’s evident failure to recognize manifest 
injustice as a result of the trial judge’s failure to follow section 558.021.2 in 
Johnson’s case.  Ultimately, this Part concludes that the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri defied Alleyne precedent when it failed to uphold the statutory safeguards 
regarding predatory sexual offender sentencing and therefore failed to recog-
nize manifest injustice in Johnson’s case. 
A.  The Supreme Court of Missouri’s Statutory Interpretation of      
Section 566.125.5(3) 
When interpreting a statute, the Supreme Court of Missouri adheres to the 
principle that it must construe statutory language in a way that best furthers 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 524. 
 194. See generally Johnson, 524 S.W.3d 505. 
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legislative intent.195  To determine legislative intent from statutory language, 
the court applies the “plain meaning rule.”196  The plain meaning rules states 
that if the intent of the legislature is clear and unambiguous when the language 
used in the statute is given its plain and ordinary meaning, then the court must 
refrain from consulting other rules of statutory interpretation.197  “A text is un-
ambiguous if a person of ordinary intelligence would find its meaning plain 
and clear.”198  To the contrary, a text is ambiguous if its language “is subject 
to more than one reasonable interpretation.”199  In Missouri, if there are two 
ways to read a statute, and one way implies a constitutional violation while the 
other does not, the statute should be interpreted in a way that does not entail a 
constitutional violation. 200  Other rules of statutory interpretation should only 
be consulted if a text is ambiguous.201 
While the court determined that section 566.125.5(3) unambiguously ap-
plies to acts that are the bases for the current charges on the ground that the 
statute fails to refer to “prior” or “previous” acts,202 its analysis fails to con-
vincingly demonstrate that the language in the statute is only subject to one 
reasonable interpretation.  The court reached its conclusion that section 
566.125.5(3) applies to acts serving as the bases for the current charges by fo-
cusing solely on the first clause in the statute: “[h]as committed an act or acts 
against more than one victim which would constitute an offense or offenses 
listed in subsection 4 of this section.”203  The court emphasized the lack of 
reference to “prior” or “previous” acts in the statute in determining that the 
legislature intended section 566.125.5(3) to apply to acts that form the bases 
for the current charges and concluded that to hold otherwise would force the 
court to “impermissibly add language to an unambiguous statute.”204 
However, as Judge Stith indicated in her dissent, the second clause pre-
sent in section 566.125.5(3) further provides that a predatory sexual offender 
determination is to be based on the defendant’s commission of an act or acts 
against multiple victims, “whether or not the defendant was charged with an 
 
 195. Matthew Davis, Note, Statutory Interpretation in Missouri, 81 MO. L. REV. 
1127, 1129 (2016); see, e.g., Stiers v. Dir. of Revenue, 477 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Mo. 2016) 
(en banc); Greer v. Sysco Food Servs., 475 S.W.3d 655, 666 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 196. Davis, supra note 195, at 1129. 
 197. Id.; Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 510–11; see also Howard v. City of Kan. City, 
332 S.W.3d 772, 787 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). 
 198. Davis, supra note 195 at 1129; see also Wolff Shoe Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 
762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). 
 199. Davis, supra note 195, at 1129 (quoting State v. Liberty, 370 S.W.3d 537, 548 
(Mo. 2012) (en banc)). 
 200. Id. at 1141. 
 201. See id. at 1129; Parktown Imps., Inc. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 
672 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 202. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 511. 
 203. Id. at 509 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 566.125.5(3) (Cum. Supp. 2017)). 
 204. Id. at 511. 
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additional offense or offenses as a result of such act or acts.”205  Judge Stith 
emphasized the presence of the word “additional” in the statute in her argument 
that the legislature did not intend section 566.125.5(3) to apply to acts that form 
the bases for the current charges.206 
The language in section 566.125.5(3) regarding an “additional” offense 
might be directed towards some prior act for which a defendant was not 
charged, as noted by Judge Breckenridge in her concurrence.207  But the fact 
that this language might be read to suggest it applies to such prior acts does not 
preclude the majority’s plain reading of the first clause present in section 
566.125.5(3), which just refers to an act or acts against multiple victims, nor 
does it imply that Judge Stith’s interpretation is wholly unreasonable. 
Given the conflicting, yet reasonable, views of the majority and the dis-
sent of the “plain meaning” behind the language of section 566.125.5(3), the 
court should have deemed the language of the section ambiguous in Johnson.  
If the court had deemed section 566.125.5(3) ambiguous, it could have looked 
to other rules of statutory construction to assist in discerning the intent of the 
legislature, notably the broader legislative purpose for the predatory sexual of-
fender statute and how section 558.021.2 influences the determination of that 
legislative purpose. 
As noted by Judge Stith in her dissenting opinion, interpreting section 
566.125.5(3) to apply to acts that form the bases for the current charges means 
the enhanced mandatory minimum applies in every case with more than one 
victim, as it requires the trial judge to determine prior to submission of the case 
to the jury whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the defend-
ant committed a listed act against more than one victim.208  It is difficult to 
imagine that the legislature wanted every offender who commits charged 
crimes against multiple victims and against whom a submissible case was made 
to automatically receive an enhanced mandatory minimum.  If this were the 
desired result, the legislature “would have so provided,” as Judge Stith wrote 
in her dissent.209 
Next, the court should have noted the constitutional consequences of con-
sidering section 566.125.5(3), as interpreted to apply to acts that form the bases 
for the current charges, in light of section 558.021.2, a separate statute that 
provides the procedural mandates that must be followed before a trial court 
may subject a defendant to predatory sexual offender sentence enhancement in 
a trial by jury.210  When section 566.125.5(3) is read to include acts that form 
the bases for the current charges, the precedent of Alleyne is violated because 
 
 205. Id. at 523 (Stith, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting § 566.125.5(3)). 
 206. See id. 
 207. Id. at 517 (Breckenridge, J., concurring). 
 208. Id. at 523 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 209. Id. at 524. 
 210. Davis, supra note 195, at 1139; see also Williams v. State, 386 S.W.3d 750, 
754 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).  These statutes are commonly referred to as “statutes in pari 
materia.”  Davis, supra note 195, at 1139. 
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the trial judge is forced to determine a fact beyond a reasonable doubt that in-
creases a defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence prior to submission of the 
case to the jury under section 558.021.2.  When section 566.125.5(3) is read to 
include only prior acts, this erroneous result is avoided.  As such, the court 
should have interpreted section 566.125.5(3) in a way that is most harmonious 
with Alleyne precedent, finding that section 566.125.5(3) should not be read to 
include acts that form the bases for the currently charged offenses. 
B.  Section 566.125.5(3) Cannot Be Reconciled with Alleyne                      
Precedent When Read to Include Acts that Are the Bases for the     
Current Charges 
The Supreme Court of Missouri insisted that, just because the jury ulti-
mately found the fact necessary to subject Johnson to enhanced sentencing, it 
is of no consequence whether the trial judge is also required to make such a 
factual finding, nor whether the trial judge makes such a factual finding before 
or after the case is submitted to the jury.211  The court’s holding, however, can-
not be reconciled with Alleyne precedent. 
Alleyne expressly requires that any factual findings that increase the man-
datory minimum be found by a jury, rather than a judge.212  According to the 
court, the factual finding that increases the mandatory minimum pursuant to 
section 566.125.5(3) is that a defendant committed an act or acts against mul-
tiple victims, even if those act or acts comprise the bases for the current 
charges.213  Section 558.021.2 plainly authorizes that in a jury trial the judge 
must find this fact prior to submission of the case to the jury.214  This procedural 
requirement violates the holding in Alleyne because it plainly authorizes a 
judge to make a determination that must be reserved for the jury. 
The court suggested that requiring a trial court to additionally find the 
necessary facts – in this case, that Johnson committed acts against more than 
one victim – adds a “layer of protection above and beyond that required by 
Alleyne”;215 however, this conclusion misinterprets Alleyne’s holding and de-
fies the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent interpretation of Alleyne.  
Instead of endorsing a scheme that adds a “layer of protection” to the sentenc-
ing of predatory sexual offenders, the Supreme Court of Missouri validated a 
method of sentence enhancement that robs the defendant of his Sixth Amend-
ment jury-trial guarantee and instead places his sentencing fate in the hands of 
the trial judge. 
In 2016, the United States Supreme Court in Hurst, while applying the 
principles set forth in Alleyne, refused the precise line of reasoning adopted by 
 
 211. See Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 512. 
 212. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116 (2013). 
 213. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 512. 
 214. MO. REV. STAT. § 558.021.2 (2016). 
 215. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 512 n.8. 
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the majority in Johnson.216  In Hurst, the Court held that a Florida statute, 
which required a judge to make a determination that a defendant should be 
punished by death in addition to the jury’s recommendation, did not provide a 
defendant with “additional protection” in sentencing.217  Because the statute at 
issue in Hurst permitted the judge to find an aggravating circumstance inde-
pendent of the jury’s fact-finding, the Court determined Florida’s statute was 
unconstitutional.218 
Under the Alleyne and Hurst framework, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
incorrectly found section 566.125.5(3) constitutional with respect to acts that 
form the bases for the current charges.  Because section 558.021.2 allows a 
sentencing judge to find the necessary fact that the defendant committed an act 
or acts against multiple victims pursuant to section 566.125.5(3) independent 
of the jury’s fact-finding and prior to submission of the case to the jury, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri should have found the predatory sexual offender 
sentencing scheme unconstitutional when applied to acts that form the bases 
for the current charges.  As noted by Judge Stith in her dissent, this statutory 
scheme violates the Sixth Amendment as it stands because it permits what Al-
leyne expressly prohibits – using a trial judge’s findings to increase the man-
datory minimum.219 
C.  The Supreme Court of Missouri’s Failure to Recognize Manifest 
Injustice Resulting from the Trial Court’s Failure to Comply with     
Section 558.021.2 Is Inconsistent with Prior Decisions 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that the trial judge’s 
failure to comply with the procedural requirements of section 558.021.2 was 
“evident, obvious, and clear” and conceded that the error “facially involve[d] 
substantial rights.”220  Despite these findings, the court failed to recognize the 
miscarriage of justice that resulted from the trial court’s error.221  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri further acknowledged that “if either the [trial] court or the 
jury would fail to find the required predicate facts, the defendant could not be 
sentenced as a predatory sexual offender.”222  But despite the trial court’s fail-
ure to find the required predicate fact in Johnson’s case in accordance with the 
statutory parameters set forth by section 558.021.2, the court allowed Johnson 
to be sentenced as a predatory sexual offender.223 
 
 216. See supra Part III.C.; Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 523–24 (Stith, J., dissenting); 
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621 (2016). 
 217. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622. 
 218. Id. at 624. 
 219. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 522 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 220. Id. at 513–14 (majority opinion). 
 221. Id. at 515. 
 222. Id. at 512–13. 
 223. Id. at 515. 
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The court maintained the trial court’s violation of section 558.021.2 could 
not have result in manifest injustice because Johnson did not assert that the 
government failed to put forth evidence supporting his predatory sexual of-
fender charge or was unfairly given “two bites at the apple.”224 The court’s 
decision to limit the manifest injustice analysis to the aforementioned scenarios 
is perplexing.  By making such a categorically-based decision, the court 
seemed to be basing its holding that no manifest injustice occurred on a retrib-
utivist justification that Johnson got what he deserved and that violations of 
judicial technicalities do not change that. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri has previously recognized that manifest 
injustice exists when a defendant is “sentenced to a punishment greater than 
the maximum sentence for an offense.”225  Specifically, the court has recog-
nized that a trial court’s failure to follow the procedural requirements of section 
558.021.2 results in prejudice when such failure results in a defendant “being 
subjected to a much longer sentence than that recommended by a jury of his 
peers.”226  Further, the Supreme Court of Missouri has stated that plain error 
can be found “if the error was outcome determinative.”227 
The court mistakenly concluded that no manifest injustice resulted from 
the trial court’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements of section 
558.021.2 because the trial court’s violation was determinative of whether 
Johnson was sentenced as a predatory sexual offender.  Without a predatory 
sexual offender finding, Johnson would have been entitled to unconditional re-
lease after serving a twenty-five-year sentence.228  In reality, with a predatory 
sexual offender finding, Johnson was sentenced to life in prison with his first 
parole eligibility at twenty-five years.229  The trial court did not find the predi-
cate fact necessary to deem Johnson a predatory sexual offender prior to sub-
mission of the case to the jury.230  Such a finding by the trial court should have 
prevented Johnson from being sentenced as a predatory sexual offender, re-
gardless of whether the jury subsequently found Johnson guilty of the predicate 
fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In finding that no manifest injustice resulted in Johnson’s case, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri emphasized the fact that Johnson waived his statutory 
right to jury sentencing.231  The court distinguished Johnson’s case from Teer, 
where the court found manifest injustice resulted after a trial judge found a 
 
 224. Id. at 514 (quoting State v. Severe, 307 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Mo. 2010) (en 
banc)). 
 225. Id. at 519–20 (Stith, J., dissenting) (quoting Severe, 307 S.W.3d at 642); see 
also supra Part III.D. 
 226. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 515 (quoting State v. Teer, 275 S.W.3d 258, 262 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc)). 
 227. Id. (Stith, J., dissenting) (quoting Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 427 (Mo. 
2002) (en banc)). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 509–10 (majority opinion). 
 231. Id. at 515. 
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss2/12
2018] DISREGARDING STATUTORY SAFEGUARDS 525 
defendant as a predatory sexual offender after the jury had already recom-
mended a sentence, because Johnson was not deprived of the opportunity to 
receive a more lenient sentence by a jury of his peers, as he had previously 
waived his right to jury sentencing. This attempted distinction, however, lacks 
muster.  Had the trial judge maintained his original determination that Johnson 
was not a predatory sexual offender prior to submission of the case to the jury, 
the judge and the jury would have come out differently on the issue of whether 
Johnson should be deemed a predatory sexual offender.232 
The consequence of the judge and jury’s disagreement would have been 
that Johnson escaped being sentenced as a predatory sexual offender, as both 
the judge and the jury must find the defendant to qualify as a predatory sexual 
offender in order for sentencing enhancement to apply.233  By agreeing to re-
consider the government’s request that Johnson be sentenced as a predatory 
sexual offender after the jury verdicts, which convicted Johnson of twelve of 
thirteen sexual felony counts, had been released, it is clear that the trial judge 
did not make the predicate findings required by section 558.021.2 inde-
pendently from the jury.  Indeed, it appears clear that the trial judge conven-
iently changed his mind after learning that the jury convicted Johnson. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Because declaring section 566.125.5(3) unconstitutional when applied to 
acts that form the bases for the current charges would have permitted sexual 
offenders who, like Johnson, allegedly committed sexual acts against multiple 
victims to escape the wrath of enhanced sentencing, the approach taken by the 
court was likely motivated by its desire to avoid this policy result.  It is possible 
that the Supreme Court of Missouri’s approach in Johnson was motivated by 
the tough-on-crime mentality that has been sweeping the nation since the early 
1970s and 1980s.  Regardless of the policy justification, this approach failed to 
adhere to the Alleyne precedent and compromised Johnson’s Sixth Amendment 
right. 
Despite the Alleyne precedent, analysis of the majority’s decision in John-
son indicates that the court attempted to circumvent the requirement that the 
jury – and the jury alone – find all facts that increase a defendant’s mandatory 
minimum sentence by requiring that the trial judge additionally find the requi-
site facts necessary for sentence enhancement.  On the other hand, had the Su-
preme Court of Missouri properly applied the precedent of Alleyne, then, for 
the reasons outlined above,234 it would have found the statute unconstitutional 
when applied to acts that serve as the bases for the current charges. 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court of Missouri defied the United States Su-
preme Court’s clear holdings of Alleyne and Hurst in interpreting the Sixth 
 
 232. Id. at 509. 
 233. Id. at 521–22 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 234. See supra Part V.A & B. 
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Amendment jury-trial guarantee, as well as its duty to declare the statute un-
constitutional when applied to acts that form the bases for the current charges.  
By failing to properly enforce and adhere to the procedural requirements de-
lineated in section 558.021.2, the Supreme Court of Missouri took part in the 
exact type of “judicial emasculation of the legislative direction”235 that the 
court itself previously warned against. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s faulty application of the Alleyne prec-
edent is concerning, but the court’s express excusal of the trial court’s disregard 
for the statutory procedure mandated by section 558.021.2 is possibly more 
concerning.  The sentencing scheme presented by the predatory sexual offender 
statutes is clearly incompatible with Alleyne precedent.  Although the scheme 
itself cannot be remedied by the Supreme Court of Missouri, it can and should 
be identified as unconstitutional as applied to currently charged acts, as in 
Johnson’s case, so that justice may be served through legislative revision of the 
statute.  The Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in Johnson sends a clear 
message to the lower courts in Missouri that it is okay, and even encouraged, 
to violate statutory procedural mandates.  By endorsing such conduct, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri sends an even clearer message that it is okay for the 
courts to sidestep the interests of justice in favor of engaging in a form of self-








 235. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 520 (Stith, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Teer, 275 
S.W.3d 258, 262 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)). 
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